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Abstract This manifesto is the result of the Perspective
Workshop Network Attack Detection and Defense held in
Schloss Dagstuhl (Germany) from March 2nd–6th, 2008.
The participants of the workshop represent researchers from
Austria, France, Norway, the Switzerland, the United States,
and Germany who work actively in the field of intrusion
detection and network monitoring. The workshop atten-
dee’s opinion was that intrusion detection and flow analysis,
which have been developed as complementary approaches
for the detection of network attacks, should more strongly
combine event detection and correlation techniques to better
meet future challenges in future reactive security.
The workshop participants considered various perspec-
tives to envision future network attack detection and de-
fense. The following topics are seen as important in the
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duction of situation awareness, the improvement of meas-
urement technology, taxonomy of attacks, the application of
intrusion and fraud detection for web services, and anomaly
detection.
In order to realize those visions the state of the art, the
challenges, and research priorities were identified for each
topic by working groups. The outcome of the discussion is
summarized in working group papers which are published in
the workshop proceedings. The papers were compiled by the
editors to this manifesto.
Keywords Intrusion detection · Network monitoring ·
Early warning systems · Situation awareness ·
Measurement requirements
1 Rationale
The increasing dependence of human society on informa-
tion technology (IT) systems requires appropriate measures
to cope with their misuse. The growing potential of threats,
which make these systems more and more vulnerable, is
caused by the complexity of the technologies themselves
and by the growing number of individuals that are able to
abuse the systems. Subversive insiders, hackers, and ter-
rorists get better and better opportunities for attacks. In
industrial countries this concerns both numerous compa-
nies and the critical infrastructures, e.g. the health care sys-
tem, the traffic system, power supply, trade (in particular
e-commerce), or the military protection.
Reactive measures comprise beside the classical virus
scanner intrusion detection and flow analysis. The devel-
opment of intrusion detection systems began already in the
eighties. Intrusion detection systems possess a prime impor-
tance as reactive measures. A wide range of commercial in-
trusion detection products has been offered meanwhile; es-
pecially for misuse detection. The deployment of intrusion
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detection technology still evokes a lot of unsolved problems.
These concern among others the still high false positive
rate in practical use, the scalability of the supervised do-
mains, and explanatory power of anomaly-based intrusion
indications.
In recent years network monitoring and flow analysis
has been developed as a complementary approach for the
detection of network attacks. Flow analysis aims at the
detection of network anomalies based on traffic measure-
ments. Their importance arose with the increasing appear-
ance of denial of service attacks and worm evasions, which
are less efficient to detect with intrusion detection systems.
The flow analysis community developed two approaches
for high speed data collection: flow monitoring and packet
sampling. Flow monitoring aims to collect statistical infor-
mation about specific portions of the overall network traffic,
e.g. information about end-to-end transport layer connec-
tions. On the other hand, packet sampling reduces the traffic
using explicit filters or statistical sampling algorithms.
2 Objectives
The objective of the Perspective Workshop Network Attack
Detection and Defense was to discuss future challenges in
reactive security, in particular in intrusion detection and flow
analysis. New challenges arise as the functionality of net-
work monitoring, attack detection and mitigation must be
suitable for a large variety of attacks, and has to be scal-
able for high data rates and number of flows. Event cor-
relation techniques can be used to combine results from
both worlds. The workshop was the first one devoted to this
topic in Dagstuhl. A particular objective of this workshop
was to bring together both the intrusion detection and net-
work monitoring communities, which still do their research
relatively separated and are organized in different commu-
nities (e.g. WGs SIDAR and KUVS in the German Society
of Informatics (GI) for reactive security and communica-
tion systems, respectively). The seminar was supposed to
foster the coordination of the research activities in both
communities.
3 Deliverables
The outcome of the workshop is a written manifesto, de-
tailing the open issues and possible research perspectives
for the coming 5–10 years according to the objectives given
above. The manifesto was compiled by the editors listed at
the front page based on the working group papers. Pavel
Laskov kindly added a section on anomaly detection. The
seminar participants and the composition of the working
groups are listed in the appendix.
4 Scoping
4.1 Intrusion detection
The security function intrusion detection deals with the
monitoring of IT systems to detect security violations. The
decision which activities have to be considered as secu-
rity violations in a given context is defined by the applied
security policy. Two main complementary approaches are
applied: anomaly and misuse detection. Anomaly detection
aims at the exposure of abnormal system and/or network be-
havior. It requires a comprehensive set of data describing the
normal system and network behavior. Although much re-
search has been done in this area, it is difficult to achieve
so that anomaly detection has currently still a limited practi-
cal importance. Misuse detection focuses on the (automated)
detection of known attacks described by patterns, called sig-
natures. These patterns are used to identify an attack in an
audit data stream. This approach is applied by the majority
of the systems used in practice. Their effectiveness, how-
ever, is also still limited. Intrusion detection systems are
further classified in network- and host-based systems. Net-
work intrusion detection systems analyze the network traffic
to find suspicious attack patterns. They have proven to be ro-
bust and are preferably applied in today’s commercial prod-
ucts. The development of field proven host-based systems
seems to be more difficult. Today’s solutions are mostly only
able to capture simple attacks, especially by matching sin-
gle step signatures in audit data streams, which have to be
generated by special audit functions after a security relevant
event took place.
The successful deployment of intrusion detection sys-
tems in practice still has to cope with a number of chal-
lenges. One problem is the accuracy of the detection models
(such as signatures or specifications). When detection
models are overly restrictive, false negatives are possible.
This is particularly problematic for misuse detection sys-
tems that specify the properties of a particular attack. Here,
care must be taken that the properties are not too specific
and only valid for a very narrow set of instances of the
complete class of attacks. When attack models are overly
permissive, on the other hand, they will also match benign
traffic. This is often the case with anomaly-based systems.
A result of matching benign traffic is a large number of false
positives. False positives undermine the trust in the intrusion
detection system as they often cause lengthy investigations
of valid network traffic. A second problem faced by intru-
sion detection systems is the large number of alerts that
they produce. Network packets are at a very low level, and
a single attack scenario run by an adversary (which includes
scans, brute-force attacks against multiple services, etc.) can
quickly generate hundreds or even thousands of individual
packets that match an attack specification. The result is hun-
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dreds or thousands of very similar alerts that actually refer to
a single root cause. Alert correlation was proposed to infer
high-level attack scenarios from a stream of low-level alerts.
Unfortunately, the different alert formats and the difficulty
of inferring strategies from low-level events make this prob-
lem challenging.
The main merit of anomaly-based intrusion detection
techniques is their ability to detect previously unknown at-
tacks. One might think that the collective expertise amassed
in the computer security community and a sophisticated
infrastructure for dissemination of security-related advice
(e.g. vulnerability tracking systems and signature database)
rule out major outbreaks of “genuinely novel” exploits. Un-
fortunately, signs are appearing that a wide-scale deploy-
ment of efficient tools for obfuscation, mutation, and simple
encryption of attacks generate a huge variability of, strictly
speaking, only “marginally novel” but nevertheless unde-
tectable with modern signature-based tools attacks. This re-
ality brings anomaly detection back into the limelight of
scientific interest.
4.2 Network monitoring
Network monitoring has become a major building block for
various applications in the networking community. Exam-
ples range from accounting and charging to attack detection
scenarios. The main challenges for network monitoring are
the significant bandwidth growth compared to the process-
ing speed of the monitoring probes. Thus, several solutions
have been developed that allow reducing the processing re-
quirements for network monitoring and analysis. The pri-
mary idea behind all these concepts is to split the mon-
itoring and the subsequent analysis into two independent
tasks. Hence, monitoring probes gather and export only the
necessary information, keeping the amount of transferred
monitoring data at an acceptably low level.
The first concept is the concept of flow monitoring. The
key idea is to store information about packet flows and the
corresponding statistics instead of individual packet infor-
mation. In this context, a flow is defined as a unidirectional
stream of IP packets identified by a common parameters
such as the IP-five-tuple (protocol type, source IP address,
destination IP address, source port, destination port). Doing
this, a single measurement record can contain information
of up to several thousand packets. For transmission of mon-
itoring data to a remote analyzer, standard protocols such as
Netflow.v9 or IPFIX (IP flow information export) have been
developed.
In some kinds of analyses such as intrusion detection,
flow statistics do not provide sufficient information about
the monitored traffic. Although flow statistics may be used
for anomaly detection, signature-based detection schemes
usually work on the packet payload which is not contained
in the flow records. Therefore, the applicability of flow ac-
counting for intrusion detection is limited. To support the
selection of single but complete packets and transporting
them to an analyzer, packet sampling techniques were de-
veloped. They allow the selection of individual packets on
the basis of filters and samplers. While filters are used for
deterministic packet selection based on matching fields in
the IP header, samplers select packets using a given sam-
pling algorithm. The selected packets can be exported to the
analyzer using the PSAMP protocol.
5 Research agenda and topics
This section presents the visions and research requirements,
as seen by the workshop participants, to improve the quality
and effectiveness of network attack detection and defense in
the next years. They are the result of multiple discussions
during the workshop as well as the outcome of separate
working groups formed during the workshop. The following
topics were discussed in the working groups:




• Requirements for network monitoring from an IDS per-
spective,
• Intrusion and fraud detection for web services.
Moreover, a topic Anomaly detection was added by the edi-
tors. This part was written by Pavel Laskov.
5.1 Early warning systems
Recently the interest in Early Warning Systems arose that
inform about suspicious activities in the monitored system
or network. Early warning systems aim at detecting un-
classified but potentially harmful system behavior based on
preliminary indications. They are considered complemen-
tary to intrusion detection systems. Both kinds of systems
try to detect, identify and react before possible damage oc-
curs and contribute to an integrated and aggregated situation
report. A particular emphasis of early warning systems is to
establish hypotheses and predictions as well as to generate
advises in still not completely understood situations. Thus
the term early has two meanings: a) to start early in time
aiming to minimize damage, and b) to process uncertain and
incomplete information.
We see an early warning system consisting of the follow-
ing process chain:
1. Observation of system behavior,
2. Pre-classification in order to concentrate on relevant ob-
servations,
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3. Learning a suitable classification framework,
4. Applying the learned classification framework on actual
observations and evaluation of current system behavior,
and
5. Triggering appropriate countermeasures.
This process chain is meant as a continuously working
pipeline with feedback to adjust preceding steps.
5.1.1 State-of-the-art
For each step of the process, first proposals are known to the
community, but the process chain has not been studied yet
and needs future research.
5.1.2 Challenges
In order to implement the early warning process a number
of challenges have to be addressed. An early warning sys-
tem has to deal with still unclassified not well-understood
but potentially harmful system behavior. Further, a set of
countermeasures must be defined which have to be ap-
propriately customized and initiated in order to detect and
prevent a threat. Since effective early warning can only be
realized by a cooperative approach, the different interests
of all involved parties have to be considered. Moreover,
non-technical challenges include the establishment of trust
relations among parties participating in the early warning
system as well as compliance with legislation. How to mo-
tivate parties to contribute to an early warning system and
what are suitable business models to operate and maintain
such a system are additional open questions.
The challenges of early warning systems require the co-
operation of different communities especially that of net-
work measurement, machine learning, intrusion detection,
and information engineering.
5.2 Situation awareness
The impact of security events on a mission can be under-
stood only if cyber situation awareness is achieved. That is,
the infrastructure security officer has to be aware of what is
happening in the protected environment, and he/she needs
to understand how information, events, and possible actions
can impact the overall objectives of the mission. Cyber situ-
ation awareness allows the security officer to make critical
decisions, such as how an attack is affecting the enclave
and/or impacting the mission. Given the answers to these
questions the security officer can determine the appropriate
course of action (COA) to take.
In terms of computer network security and defense, situ-
ation awareness (SA) refers to the operational picture that
consolidates all available information that is actually needed
for identifying attacks and for selecting and applying appro-
priate countermeasures. In addition to making human beings
“situation-aware”, systems and their implementations must
also be made aware.
To get the “big picture”, the consolidation of informa-
tion needs to be performed in an appropriate model that is
comprised of resources (or assets), actors, and their inter-
dependencies. This model needs to be aligned to the actual
mission or high-level objectives of running the computer net-
work and to support different layers of granularity (e.g. from
the business process layer of a network operations center’s
point-of-view down to low-layer configuration information).
5.2.1 State-of-the-art
From the IT security community’s point-of-view, there have
been many different substantial contributions to obtaining
common operational pictures of computer networks. Exam-
ples include vulnerability management, intrusion detection,
security information & event management, and intrusion re-
sponse modelling and selection metrics. There has also been
related work identified in other areas of interest and other
research communities: system & network management, IT
service management, multi-sensor data fusion, trust mod-
elling, belief modelling and propagation, modelling of mili-
tary strategies and business processes, and game theory. The
current state-of-the art in these areas needs to be further
evaluated in order to estimate synergy benefits that can be
expected.
5.2.2 Challenges
One of the biggest challenges in research and deployment
is the development of an information consolidating model.
There are unsolved questions on how to model assets, ac-
tors, and their dependencies, honouring the network’s objec-
tives on different abstraction levels.
Even more challenges arise as soon as the necessary in-
formation for creating and updating the situation model is
not available (e.g., due to missing ability or willingness to
share) or incorrect (e.g., due to malfunction, misconfigu-
ration, or forgery). Non-available or incorrect information
may not only lead to an incomplete operational picture, but
also to contradictions that need to be resolved.
Another challenge is how to formulate hypotheses or pre-
dictions about detected phenomena and their update (sup-
port, rejection) in an iterative fashion. Including potential
adversaries introduces multiple magnitudes of complexity to
the situation awareness model.
Finally, if it becomes feasible to obtain a comprehen-
sive operational picture and reasonably verified hypotheses
about adversaries and their intentions, several new chal-
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lenges are expected to arise concerning how to actually im-
plement SA in tools and systems (e.g. situation-aware IDS).
5.3 Attack taxonomy
Attack taxonomy attempts to characterize the classes of
attacks that can be detected (well) by inspecting network
traffic.
5.3.1 State-of-the-art
Detecting scan activity in network traffic has attracted a lot
of interest in the research community over the last few years.
As a result, there are several systems and algorithms that can
be used to detect either port scans or to identify worm propa-
gation. Moreover, current traffic monitoring techniques are
useful to detect effects of attacks in order to identify hosts
that have been compromised. For example, a bot that has
been installed by a user because of a social engineering at-
tack or with the help of a successful exploit can be detected
by monitoring the network for suspicious behavior: such
hosts commonly generate either lots of scan traffic, are sus-
picious due to a large amount of mails sent via these hosts,
or generate lots of DNS queries. All such effects can be
easily detected with different traffic monitoring strategies.
Finally, current monitoring techniques allow us to detect
artifacts of attacks. For example, we can detect common at-
tack tools, ready-made exploits, or worms based on specific
signatures in the network traffic.
5.3.2 Challenges
We identified four major problems that network-based intru-
sion detection systems are facing: encrypted network traffic,
application-level attacks, performance, and evasion attacks.
1. An obvious problem in this area is payload inspection of
encrypted traffic. Since the network-based intrusion de-
tection system (NIDS) commonly has no access to the
encryption keys, it cannot decrypt the captured data and,
therefore, no analysis is possible.
2. Traditional attack venues, such as buffer overruns or ex-
ploits of input validation errors, have been known for
a long time and are widely understood. As a result, a large
number of defense mechanisms have been devised. For
client-side attacks, however, only a few viable defense
solutions have emerged so far. A distinctive feature of
these client-side attacks is that security problems often
cannot be traced to a particular vulnerability that can be
easily fixed. That is, the client’s security policy is not obvi-
ously and immediately violated. Furthermore, sending of
code from server to client becomes more and more com-
mon (e.g., AJAX sends JavaScript over the network) and
this new interaction model poses further challenges, since
a NIDS would need to inspect and verify the code. By
monitoring network traffic, such attacks are not easy to
identify as they occur at the application-level: the NIDS
would need to understand the context of requests and also
keep track of the application state. That is, one needs to
understand the application logic and try to detect attacks,
which is hard even given the current network speed.
3. Given the fact that networks are getting faster at a higher
pace then processing power is increasing, this is also
clearly a problem.
4. Finally, traffic blending attacks and similar evasion at-
tacks pose several challenges for NIDS.
To improve the detection capabilities from a network point
of view and to cope with future challenges in this area, we
developed some recommendations for future work in this
area. An application should support a NIDS such that it be-
comes easier to check for ongoing attacks. This could, for
example, be achieved by developing protocols in such a way
that the NIDS can verify – without too much overhead –
whether or not a given packet is legitimate.
We require a deeper analysis and metrics to define the
complexity of an attack. Here, we understand the complex-
ity of an attack as the difficulty to see this attack at the net-
work level. In particular, attacks that target application-level
flaws could be perfectly legitimate from a network perspec-
tive, but might arrive at an unexpected point in time or in
an unintended order. These facets should be captured by the
proposed complexity metric.
An additional area of future work is behavior based de-
tection of attacks: if we can understand the current, normal
configuration of a system, then we can detect deviations
from this profile as an attack. To achieve this goal, we need
to develop algorithms to understand what operations are
normal based on the current configuration (e.g. information
about network configuration, running services, clients that
make use of these services).
5.4 Measurement requirements
In recent years network monitoring and flow analysis has
been developed as complementary approach for the detec-
tion of network attacks. Flow analysis aims at the detection
of network anomalies based on traffic measurements. Their
importance arose with the increasing appearance of denial
of service attacks and worm evasions which are less efficient
to detect with intrusion detection systems.
5.4.1 State-of-the-art
There are a wide variety of tools available for packet
and flow measurement. The MOME database (www.ist-
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mome.de) lists more than 400 different tools. Configurable
measurements are possible to a certain extent. Standardiza-
tion efforts are in progress (IETF IPPM, IPFIX, PSAMP,
etc.).
It is difficult to provide labeled data, i.e. data that is pre-
cisely pre-classified, because it is hard to classify data from
existing networks in attack/non-attack traffic, i.e., it cannot
be decided exactly, whether the traffic includes new attacks
or not. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to generate
artificial traces due to the complexity of nowadays networks.
Data from honeypots or honeynets may help to collect use-
ful input for training intrusion detection systems.
An ideal measurement system would be the one that
captures everything everywhere. With this, attack detection
algorithms (e.g. machine learning) could extract the infor-
mation needed to detect anomalies. Nevertheless, measuring
everything everywhere would mean to fully capture each
packet at each network node. This is not feasible, especially
to not slow down the Internet or to not make its usage much
more expensive. Furthermore, current IDS are not capable to
handle the high amount of data that would result from full
measurements at all nodes.
The main constraints for a measurement system nowa-
days are:
(1) Resource Limitations. Measurements are limited to re-
sources that we can afford for network measurements. Lim-
itations apply for processing power, memory and transmis-
sion capacity. The situation gets worse in environments with
wireless transmission and small mobile devices.
(2) Privacy. Users have a high interest that their privacy is
protected. Capturing flow data and especially packet con-
tents (header, payload) clearly violates this. Anonymization
techniques have the disadvantage of removing information
which might contradict analysis rules. Providers have an
interest that others do not gain knowledge about their net-
work and users. As a consequence getting network traces
and sharing of data is extremely difficult nowadays.
5.4.2 Challenges
In order to cope with resource constraints we should focus
on the following topics:
• Resource Management. Methods have to be developed
to reduce resource requirements, e.g. by providing im-
proved algorithms for measurement tasks (e.g. for captur-
ing, classification) or by applying smart aggregation and
data selection techniques.
• Data Sharing. Reference traces should be provided for
the research community, in ideal case labeled data. Net-
work operators should be motivated by incentives to
share data. Further standardized measurement methods
and result representation should be applied to ensure the
comparability of measurement results.
• Privacy-preserving methods. Methods have to be de-
veloped which provide a trade-off between anonymous
information representations and applicable analysis de-
mands.
• Encrypted traffic. More and more communication is en-
crypted. Methods have to be developed which meet
measurement requirements also for this kind of traffic.
It is further important to gather cross-layer and meta infor-
mation and associate it with pure measurement results. This
includes information about specific events that may influ-
ence traffic, measurements from end system and multiple
layers.
Moreover, measurement should be an integral part of fu-
ture network design. A single measurement system for dif-
ferent task (intrusion detection, accounting, SLA validation)
should be aspired, since none of the current approaches will
meet the various demands sufficiently.
5.5 Requirements for network monitoring from an IDS
perspective
Detection of malicious traffic is based on its input data,
the information that is coming from network-based moni-
toring systems. Best detection rates would only be possible
by monitoring all data transferred over all network lines in
a distributed network. Monitoring and reporting this amount
of data is feasible in neither today’s nor will be in future’s
systems. Later analysis like stateful inspection of the traffic
imposes even more processing costs. But only at this level
of monitoring and analysis there may be a chance to capture
all attacks inside a system. So there needs to be a trade-off
between detection success and the processing costs.
5.5.1 State-of-the-art
Malicious traffic is mostly generated by compromised sys-
tems. Catching attackers during the process of taking over
a vulnerable host is complicated, as such attacks only use
very low traffic volumes. For higher monitoring data rates,
the effects of attacks may be easier monitored like scans
for vulnerabilities, large file transfers, or mass spam dis-
tribution. Most of these attacks are initiated by script kid-
dies using downloaded tools, maybe slightly modified. So
far, these automated attacks focus on the mass market and
do not implement any sophisticated anti-IDS techniques.
This fact improves the chance of detecting these attempts
dramatically.
Netflow monitoring has become widely accepted as stan-
dard to create statistics about network traffic transferred by
routers. The IETF defined a protocol to carry flow infor-
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mation over the network called IP flow information export
(IPFIX). It includes a standard which allows the transfer
of per-packet information like payload data. Standard 5-
tuple flow aggregation produces around 8000 Flows/s for
a 1 GBit/s link. Only few methods are available for mitigat-
ing DoS attacks on monitors based on a hash table. In order
to enable the processing of high data rates, dynamic recon-
figuration of monitors become an issue for attack detection.
Currently, only few monitoring systems support seamless
reconfiguration without packet losses. To solve the problem
in environments with even higher speeds, several methods of
packet sampling and filtering are employed.
5.5.2 Challenges
The location of monitoring systems also poses several un-
solved challenges: monitoring and analysis can be run in
a combined way on end systems. This way, the attack de-
tection is heavily distributed and would enable full payload
inspection, although correlation of the analysis results will
be difficult in this solution. The more conventional way of
placing monitoring systems on the network backbone im-
plies that high data rates only allow a coarse analysis of the
data. Detailed analysis would only be feasible for a portion
of the traffic. Therefore, we have to work on methods that
find the best balance between the massively distributed case
and the more centralized high-speed monitoring approach.
Such adaptive monitoring techniques would allow focusing
attack detection algorithms on selected suspicious data for
more detailed inspection.
For an attacker, it is always easier to avoid detection by
coarse grained anomaly-based algorithms compared to de-
tailed inspection. We believe that evasion will always be
possible unless detection methods analyze full packet pay-
load data and detect anomalies in the semantic content of
the application layer. The tradeoff becomes visible in IP and
TCP fragmentation issues: connection reassembly does not
offer the speeds required for the data rates that occur in
backbone networks.
Flow monitoring and analysis techniques, which are op-
erating only on the header information, are often not suffi-
cient for proper attack detection, especially for misuse de-
tection techniques. A trade-off would be the use of flow data
accompanied with payload information, like the first N byte
of a stream. This solution would be challenging in terms of
high-speed operation, but feasible. In addition, hashes and
sampling techniques must be developed that avoid overload-
ing monitors in distributed denial-of-service attack scenario.
So far we have only considered plain, unencrypted traf-
fic whose payload may be analyzed directly. But current
trends in networking show that the amount of encrypted
traffic, tunnels and, in general, overlays is increasing. Mon-
itoring this data introduces more problems: Content is ob-
scured and only statistical features may be used for detec-
tion of malicious data. Usage of other networks like 3G
networks for mobile devices also increases and those of-
fer entire new types of attacks, e.g. power depletion. The
structure of these networks is often fundamentally differ-
ent from the Internet: the operator has complete control
over the network. As only little information is available
about those networks, we did not include them in our
considerations.
In today’s Internet protocol architecture the application
layer protocol number (i.e. destination port) is meaning-
less. Furthermore, the specification of lower protocol layers
allows “interesting” protocol use like using only one byte
of payload per packet. These limitations can be countered
in the future: The introduction of a separate control plane
which allows application layer protocol checks by lower
layer processing entities would lessen this problem. IANA
could assign IDs for protocols that have a defined specifi-
cation also involving lower layer packet structures. An ex-
ample of this idea could be that a specific data request (e.g.
a HTTP request) must lie inside the first one or two pack-
ets of the corresponding connection. Connection reassem-
bly would not be needed any more. The challenge for this
problem is it to be designed properly without limiting the
flexibility of having stacked protocol layers. The first step
of starting this development could be the implementation
of application layer checks and lower level protocol restric-
tions in currently used protocols, so that both approaches
remain compatible to each other for easy migration. The
next step would be the definition of a new clean-slate ap-
proach for future protocols.
5.6 Intrusion and fraud detection for web services
Web services (WS) technology bears the promise to finally
bring the power of SOA (Service-oriented Architecture)
middleware to the road on a large scale and across orga-
nizational domains. Big players such as Google, Amazon,
SAP, and IBM have already adopted the technology. Euro-
pean funding agencies are strongly believing and heavily
investing into WS-related technological developments and
application scenarios. A growing adoption and widespread
use of Web services for different application areas can be ex-
pected, among them e.g. value added service composition,
Web 2.0-enhanced communication systems (e.g. based on
Ajax), and focused service offerings from specialized small
or medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
5.6.1 State-of-the-art
More and more technical aspects of WS technology are be-
ing standardized, among them standards for security and
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policy enforcement. Many research groups directly focus
on insufficiencies of the existing standards. However, these
standards do neither address the availability of Web ser-
vices, nor intrusion detection, nor fraud detection. A vis-
ible trend in the amount of work invested is the appli-
cation of formal methods for model driven policy gener-
ation and verification. Another cluster of interest revolves
around the problem of securing service choreography and
orchestration. Finally, a lot of work is seen in the area of
authorization modeling and enforcement. As a main con-
clusion we observe that the overwhelming amount of work
addresses threat prevention. Reactive aspects have to date
been largely ignored, such as detecting and mitigating at-
tacks and frauds at the service layer of the computing
system.
5.6.2 Challenges
Clearly, there is an urgent need for methodologies and tools
to counter intrusions and fraud geared towards Web ser-
vices. We state that this need is urgent even though vulnera-
bilities of Web services are not yet exploited on a large scale.
Analyses of potential attacks against Web services revealed
that Web services are very vulnerable especially against
DoS attacks [2]. On the other hand, Web services and tech-
nology not only open a new window for vulnerabilities; they
also offer unprecedented opportunities for the detection of
intrusions and fraud. The novel idea we propose is to lever-
age available formal descriptions of system behavior, such
as provided formal interface and policy descriptions, to gen-
erate models of acceptable behavior and detect deviations
thereof by dedicated security services. Concrete approaches
might be:
• Extension of WS policy specifications beyond confiden-
tiality and integrity to enable intrusion and fraud detec-
tion,
• Transformations of formal WS descriptions into systems
for deviation detection to leverage existing specifications,
• Investigation of existing IDS approaches to re-use avail-
able technology for the WS environment,
• Design of methods for the integration of service policies
across domains to monitor composite services,
• Development of new efficient XML processing methods
and algorithms to counter the effects of resource exhaus-
tion attacks.
Thus, detection is comprehended as a part of the life cycle
of Web services, influencing the trust evaluation of services
and thereby guiding service selection. As service providers
realize that their services are used less frequently as a con-
sequence of lax internal and external security, they may
implement better safeguards in order to re-gain the trust of
the user community.
5.7 Anomaly detection
The main idea of modern anomaly detection methods is to
build reliable models of normal behavior and detect devia-
tions thereof. The models can be built at a network or host
level, or, generally speaking, for any kind of events observed
in a system.
5.7.1 State-of-the-art
Two main challenges arising in anomaly detection systems
are:
1. Dealing with contaminated “normal data”, and
2. Measuring similarity between monitored events.
Both of these challenges have been addressed, although in
an abstract way, in the machine learning community. The
impact of contamination on normality models can be dimin-
ished by regularization, a technique that penalizes overly
complex models resulting from trying to accommodate
contaminated data. Recently developed similarity-based
anomaly detection algorithms offer a possibility to abstract
mathematical characterizations of normality behind the no-
tion of similarity. In other words, once a reasonable notion
of similarity is defined for pairs of observed events, the al-
gorithms provide a meaningful measure of abnormality.
5.7.2 Challenges
The application of anomaly detection methods in the realm
of network intrusion detection still contains many unsolved
challenges. The definition and especially the efficient com-
putation of similarity measures for highly structured events
arising from network monitoring are quite nontrivial, es-
pecially if a detailed protocol analysis beyond byte se-
quences is desired. Another serious challenge is dealing
with “chaff”, unusual but benign events that account for
the majority of false alarms. Here some kind of integra-
tion of additional knowledge – possibly in the form of small
amounts of labeled data – may be necessary. Finally, in
order to be recognized in practice anomaly detection has
to provide explanations of its predictions to be digested in
a wider context of situation awareness.
6 Conclusions
The increasing dependence of human society on informa-
tion technology (IT) systems requires appropriate measures
to cope with their misuse. The growing potential of threats,
which make these systems more and more vulnerable, is
caused by the complexity of the technologies themselves
and by the growing number of individuals that are able to
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abuse the systems. Subversive insiders, hackers, and terror-
ists get better and better opportunities for attacks. In indus-
trial countries this concerns both numerous companies and
the critical infrastructures. A major challenge of modern IT
security technologies is to cope with an exploding variabil-
ity of attacks which stems from a significant commercial
motivation behind them.
Reactive measures will prove in future as the most ef-
ficient mean to ward off these threats. Intrusion detection
and network monitoring as complementary approaches will
remain the most important approaches in reactive security.
They face new challenges caused by an increasing variety of
attacks and rising data rates.
Where is the field going? We can identify the following
trends:
• The potential of threats in networked systems will fur-
ther grow as well as the number of individuals which are
able to abuse these systems. Increased efforts in research
and society are required to protect critical infrastructures
such as the health care system, the traffic system, power
supply, trade, military networks and others in industrial
countries.
• Reactive measures will further turn out as the most effi-
cient countermeasures to ward off these threats in future.
Intrusion detection and network monitoring as comple-
mentary approaches will remain the most important ap-
proaches in this context.
• A careful analysis is necessary to critically review the at-
tacks that can be captured by inspecting different input
sources. For example, certain attacks are easier to identify
when analyzing network traffic (e.g., scanning, denial of
service). Others are more readily visible at the host (such
as application-specific attacks). Thus, the community has
to invest research effort in analyzing the available data
sources and the attacks that can be detected based on these
data sources. This is of increasing importance because the
frequency of different types of threats is shifting towards
client-side and application-level attacks.
• The success and the acceptance of intrusion detection
systems essentially depend on the accurateness and the
topicality of the applied signatures. Imprecise signatures
heavily confine the detection capability of the systems
and lead to false positives or negatives, respectively. In
order to improve the accuracy of the analyses more at-
tention should be paid to approaches for the systematic
design and validation of signatures and attack models.
• An important factor for the success of reactive measure-
ments is the effort and time that is required to create a sig-
nature that captures a novel threat. Clearly, it is necessary
to quickly generate and deploy signatures because the in-
creasing automation of attack tools significantly shortens
the available response time.
• Careful analysis of evasion mechanisms, deployed to un-
dermine detection, will be needed. Numerous practical
tools are currently known for subverting anomaly detec-
tion, automatic signature generation, and other monitor-
ing instruments. Development of counter-evasion tech-
niques will require a fundamental re-thinking of many
detection methods, for example the ones based on ma-
chine learning, in order to cope with a potential adversar-
ial impact.
• Given the fact that many attacks affect a large number
of distributed hosts, cooperation between sensors and co-
ordination of response mechanisms is of paramount im-
portance. Thus, we require mechanisms that facilitate the
exchange of attack-related data in an efficient manner
while protecting the privacy of the actors whose infor-
mation is concerned. This is particularly relevant when
data is exchanged between different organizations. More-
over, the analysis power of intrusion detection can be
accelerated or improved by moving operations into the
monitoring environment. Such cross-domain optimiza-
tions need to be adaptive in terms of network load and
attack awareness.
The workshop results have demonstrated a growing inter-
est to the problems of reactive security. As the success of
reactive measures strongly depends on a seamless interac-
tion between data acquisition and analysis, there is an urgent
need to coordinate the research activities of the network
measurement and intrusion detection communities.
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